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Abstract
This paper ﬁrst documents the extent of return employment: workers returning to em-
ployers they worked for previously within the same employment spell. Employer returns are
typically involuntary and lead to lower earnings. To understand these features, the paper
then develops an equilibrium model of worker recall and on-the-job search in which job seek-
ers hold onto information they acquire about job opportunities as insurance in the event of a
job destruction shock. Allowing workers to recall contacts increases the probability of a job-
to-job transition with the number of jobs previously held during the employment spell while
the probability of an job-to-unemployment transition decreases. These transition patterns
are consistent with empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
Modern labour markets exhibit a large degree of worker churning. In the US, for example, around
six percent of employed workers separate from their employers every month. Around half of these
workers ﬁnd another job almost immediately while the other half transit to unemployment. Job
ladder models like Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) provide a
natural interpretation for these facts. In these economies, some workers move up the job ladder
over time as they search for better paid employment, while others fall from the job ladder after
job displacement and must re-climb the ladder from unemployment.
This paper ﬁrst documents a novel feature of worker job ladders: a notable fraction of job
transitions in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) involve workers returning
to employers they worked for previously within the same employment spell. Job transitions
involving an employer return are typically involuntary and lead to lower earnings. To understand
these features, this paper then develops an equilibrium model of worker recall and on-the-
job search in which job seekers hold onto information they acquire about job opportunities as
insurance in the event of a job destruction shock.
The mechanism is straightforward. From time to time, workers who engage in on-the-job
search encounter ﬁrms with job opportunities that are not currently attractive. However, it is in
the interest of these workers to establish contacts with such ﬁrms. If job matches are subject to
destruction shocks, then with positive probability the worker will lose the current job sometime
in the future. In the face of such a shock, the worker can approach the accumulated employment
contacts (if any) to inquire whether there is still a job available. If so, the worker has the option
of taking the job and avoiding unemployment. The crucial insight is that the ability of workers
to recall previously met ﬁrms allows them to accumulate “search capital”, a valuable asset that
(partially) insures them against adverse displacement shocks.1,2
The framework is similar to the one proposed by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) in which
all workers search for jobs and sequential auctions determine wages. The key diﬀerence is that
we allow workers to keep track of the identity of the ﬁrms they encounter during their search
process. We also allow for search capital depreciation: there is a positive probability that a
worker’s employment contact might disappear. In this context, it is in the interest of the ﬁrm as
well as the worker to establish contacts. With recall, a losing ﬁrm in the auction knows it will
remain in contact with the worker, at least for some period of time. Because employment for
the worker at another ﬁrm may end, ﬁrms that are in contact with the worker might at some
time in the future face less competition and hire the worker at more favourable, monopsonistic
terms. As a result, with search capital, the option value of losing the worker in a competitive
1Insurance here is not against unemployment per se but against a type of unemployment. When a laid oﬀ
worker returns to a previous employer or contact, the worker receives a take-it-or-leave-it which makes the worker
indiﬀerent between employment and unemployment with a contact. Therefore, contacts insure (in part) against
unemployment without a contact which has a strictly lower payoﬀ.
2The type of recall studied in this paper diﬀers from recall unemployment as investigated by Fernandez-Blanco
(2010) and Fujita and Moscarini (2015). Recall unemployment is a by-product of temporary layoﬀs, where
employers layoﬀ workers with the option of employing them again at some point during their unemployment
spell. In contrast, employer returns in this paper occur as a result of workers using their employer contacts to
avoid spells of unemployment.
2
auction is no longer zero (as in Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002), but positive and depends on the
extent of search frictions, job destruction and search capital depreciation.
As workers can immediately recall oﬀers following a displacement, job-to-job transitions
occur not only when new work is found but also when the current employer lets the worker go.
If on-the-job search generates a contact, the new contact and the current employer bid up the
wage. If the new contact wins the auction, voluntary job turnover can occur with a pay rise
or a pay cut, depending on the productivity of the poaching ﬁrm, among other factors. If a
displacement shock subsequently hits, the worker takes employment with a previous employer.
As a lone bidder, this ﬁrm acts monopsonistically and oﬀers a low wage equal to the worker’s
reservation wage. At this point, the worker experiences an employer return characterised by an
involuntary job-to-job transition with a pay cut.
Allowing workers to recall contacts accumulated while searching on the job also implies that
the probability of a job-to-job transition increases while the probability of a job-to-unemployment
transition decreases with the number of jobs previously held during the employment spell. Work-
ers who have had more jobs during the employment spell are likely to have accumulated more
contacts. When a displacement shock occurs, workers with more contacts have a lower proba-
bility of transiting into unemployment (and hence making a job-to-job transition) than workers
with less contacts.
These transition patterns are consistent with empirical evidence found in the NLSY. As
observed elsewhere (see Jolivet et al., 2006, among others), the NLSY dataset contains consid-
erable numbers of voluntary and involuntary job-to-job movements involving pay cuts as well
as pay rises. Moreover, the NLSY data also reveal that the number of previously held jobs
during an employment spell is positively related to the probability of a job-to-job transition
and negatively related to the probability of a job-to-unemployment transition. These ﬁndings
contrast with standard job ladder models in which workers who have held many jobs during
the employment spell are close to the top of the job ladder and hence have a lower probability
of another job-to-job transition.3 In the NLSY, workers with more employer returns or more
involuntary job transitions within an employment spell have a higher probability becoming un-
employed after a job displacement shock as the search capital model also implies but in contrast
with standard job ladder models.
Since investment in on-the-job search creates a productive resource for workers, recall aﬀects
aggregate equilibrium output. Contacts accumulated through on-the-job search provide back-up
employment opportunities that partially insure against costly unemployment from displacement
shocks. Ceteris paribus, output with recall is higher than output without recall. On-the-job
search, however, can be ineﬃcient when employed searchers crowd out the unemployed for jobs
and discourage job creation. We show that the net eﬀect is in general ambiguous but in a
calibrated version of the model with heterogeneous jobs total output increases with on-the-job
search.
This paper is closely related to Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2011), which explores the implications
3Standard job ladder models assume that job destruction shocks aﬀect all jobs equally and hence the job-to-
unemployment transition is independent of the number of jobs held during the employment spell. See, however,
recent work by Pinheiro and Visschers (2015) and Jarosh (2015).
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of recall by unemployed workers alone. Without on-the-job search, unemployed workers on the
equilibrium path are hired with no contacts. If they subsequently experience a displacement,
they become unemployed with no contacts once again. Without on-the-job search, it is the threat
of continued search while unemployed which increases the workers’ reservation wage, raises the
wage oﬀered and hence avoids the Diamond (1971) paradox. In contrast, this paper incorporates
on-the-job search as well as ﬁrm heterogeneity and optimal ﬁrm entry. These extensions create
search capital accumulation. With on-the-job search, although unemployed workers again do not
hold any contacts in equilibrium, employed workers will hold these contacts, thereby generating
the rich job-to-job and wage dynamics and the welfare properties described above.4
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section presents new evidence on employer
returns based on the NLSY. Section 3 develops the general framework, allowing for ﬁrm hetero-
geneity and recall. Section 4 deﬁnes equilibrium and describe its properties. Section 5 charac-
terises the homogeneous ﬁrms case to obtain a basic understanding of the model, while Section
6 explores the welfare implications. Section 7 analyses the models’ implications for employment
dynamics and transition probabilities. Section 8 presents a further discussion and concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
This section describes the existence and relevance of recall or return employment based on
the job-to-job transitions of white workers for the period 1979-2010 observed in the NLSY.
The overall picture emerging from this evidence is that workers search on-the-job and ﬁnd (on
average) better, more desirable jobs. From time to time, these workers return to a previous
employer but under more adverse circumstances.
Since a worker may have multiple contemporaneous jobs within an employment spell, the
analysis focuses on mobility across workers’ main jobs.5 A job-to-job transition is recorded when
the worker changes his or her main job and stops working for the ﬁrm where the main job was
located. The latter restriction is important. We observe (and do not want to consider) workers
with multiple contemporaneous jobs changing their main job without actually separating from
any of their employers.6 Given these selection criteria, the NLSY sample contains 26,094 spells
of uninterrupted employment. A little more than half of these spells (58.8%) involve only one
job. Approximately one ﬁfth (18.3%) involve two jobs. Almost a quarter of these spells (22.9%)
have three or more jobs in the same continuous spell of employment.7 The Appendix provides
further details of the construction of the sample. Here we present the main results.
4Kircher (2009) and Wolthoﬀ (2014) explore related environments with multiple bidders.
5The main job is deﬁned as the one in which the worker (sequentially in order of importance) spends more
hours, has currently a longer tenure, earns the higher wage and last longer. See the Appendix for details.
6For example, consider a worker who performs two job simultaneously. Let job ‘A’ be the main job and job
‘B’ the secondary job. There are instances when the worker’s main job changes from ‘A’ to ‘B’ and back to ‘A’
within an employment spell, while the secondary job changes from ‘B’ to ‘A’ and back to ‘B’. These transitions
do not involve a separation (the worker never stopped working for either employer), and thus are not included in
the analysis.
7A continuous employment spell starts and ends with unemployment or non-participation and thus potentially
contains multiple job spells. A job spell is the duration of a job at a given employer.
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Table 1: The Extent of Return Employment
No of spells No of spells with Returns in Returns in
with 3+ jobs at least one return spell with 2+ jobs spell with 3+ jobs
All workers 5,985 1,619 15.0% 27.1%
Gender
Female 2,779 774 14.8% 27.9%
Male 3,206 845 15.3% 26.4%
Age
25 or younger 4,460 1,253 16.2% 28.1%
26-35 1,200 287 13.1% 23.9%
36 and above 325 79 9.4% 24.3%
Years of schooling
Below 12 1,158 312 14.3% 26.9%
12 1,765 423 12.9% 24.0%
13-14 1,306 327 14.3% 25.0%
16 551 127 13.1% 23.1%
17 and above 203 52 13.2% 25.6%
Notes The NLSY sample (see Appendix) contains 26,094 spells of uninterrupted employment. 58.8% of these spells involve
only one job, 18.3% have two jobs and 22.9% have three or more jobs in the same continuous spell of employment. The
ﬁrst column reports (for diﬀerent groups) the number of spells with a potential return and the second column reports the
number of these spells with a return. The fourth columns reports the ratio of these two ﬁgures. The third column reports
the percentile of returns among employment spells with two or more jobs.
The Extent of Return Employment Returning to an employer within an uninterrupted
employment spell (which obviously involves at least two job-to-job transitions) is an important
feature of workers’ job ladders. In an employment spell, label the ﬁrst occurrence of a repeated
employer J1 and the return spell at the employer J3. Let J2 represent employment experienced
between J1 and J3 which may involve more than one job. Table 1 reveals that employer returns
occur in 27% of all employment spells with at least three jobs, in 15% of all employment spells
with at least two jobs and in 6% of all employment spells. Table 1 also reveals that these
proportions are stable across demographic groups with returns being somewhat higher for the
young and the less educated.
Voluntary and Involuntary Mobility Return employment (a J2-J3 transition) is more
likely to be involuntary than initial moves away (a J1-J2 transition). Table 2, which considers
only those employment spells that include a return, shows the proportion of job spells of the
J1-J2 type and J2-J3 type in which workers declare that they left the job due to a quit. Suppose
a voluntary job-to-job transition occurs when a worker declares he or she quit the job.8 This
table shows that about 7 out of 10 (71%) of J1-J2 transitions to new employers are voluntary. A
substantially lower percentage - approximately one half (56%) - return to a previous employer
voluntarily via a J2-J3 transition. Returning workers go back less voluntarily than when they
8The Appendix provides further details of quit classiﬁcations. Note, however, that this classiﬁcation is only
indicative of voluntary/involuntary mobility. It is unclear whether workers who state that they quit their jobs
indeed did so voluntarily or were compelled to quit.
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left the old ﬁrm. This pattern is consistent across all groups, but older and very highly educated
workers have the most pronounced proportion of involuntary returns to previous employers.
Table 2: Employment Returns and Voluntary Mobil-
ity
J1-J2 transition J2-J3 transition
Quit Quit
All workers 71.1% 55.9%
Gender
Female 75.9% 58.6%
Male 67.7% 54.0%
Age
25 or younger 72.7% 57.3%
26-35 62.8% 50.9%
36 and above 28.6% 17.4%
Years of schooling
Below 12 67.0% 58.3%
12 70.4% 59.0%
13-14 73.4% 51.7%
16 61.9% 49.1%
17 and above 73.7% 46.3%
Notes The table reports the percentage of voluntary quits (as
opposed to involuntary transitions) observed in those uninter-
rupted employment spells from the NLSY sample (see Appendix)
in which the worker returns to a previous employer. A J1-J2
transition corresponds to the job-to-job transition away from the
employer which the worker subsequently returns to. A J2-J3
transition is the job-to-job transition occurring when the worker
returns to the employer. The employer in job J1 is the same as
the employer in job J3. However, the employer in job J2 from
the J1-J2 transition is not necessarily the same as the employer
in job J2 when returning in a J2-J3 transition. Workers may
hold jobs with several diﬀerent employers during the spell before
returning to the J1 employer.
Weekly Earnings and Return Employment Returning to an employer is less ﬁnancially
rewarding than moving to a new one. Table 3, which again considers only those employment
spells that include a return, shows that among all workers, transitions to new employers (J1-
J2 transitions) raise earnings on average, whereas returns (J2-J3 transitions) involve a drop in
earnings.9 This pattern holds across all demographic groups. The net eﬀect is small compared
to the changes observed at each transition. Among all workers, for example, earnings at the
old employer after a return (a J1-J3 transition) increase on average by 10% from initial earn-
ings during J1 at that employer, while the earnings change associated with a J1-J2 or a J2-J3
transition is around three times or two times higher, respectively.
9To reduce the measurement error typically present earnings data, Table 3 presents earnings changes after
trimming both tails of the earnings distribution by 5%. Similar results are obtained when trimming the tails of
the earning distribution by 1%.
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Table 3: Employer Returns and Weekly Earnings Changes
Transitions J1-J2 Transitions J2-J3 Transitions J1-J3
J1 J2 Change J2 J3 Change Change
All workers 171.35 232.32 35.58% 235.63 187.79 -20.31% 9.59%
Gender
Female 136.78 184.31 34.75% 185.29 151.65 -18.15% 10.87%
Male 200.40 272.66 36.06% 277.94 218.15 -21.51% 8.86%
Age
25 and younger 152.91 218.25 42.73% 220.80 171.29 -22.42% 12.02%
26-35 226.02 262.24 16.03% 269.04 236.65 -12.04% 4.70%
36 and above 208.45 312.52 49.92% 312.02 221.24 -29.09% 6.14%
Years of schooling
Below 12 136.82 188.03 37.43% 191.44 160.21 -16.31% 17.09%
12 182.35 248.06 36.04% 247.23 199.23 -19.42% 9.26%
13-14 188.70 253.17 34.17% 258.72 204.13 -21.10% 8.17%
16 234.54 260.21 10.94% 269.32 250.85 -6.86% 6.95%
17 and above 251.25 333.78 32.85% 330.23 248.22 -24.83% -1.20%
Notes The table documents for diﬀerent groups of workers earnings and earnings changes observed in those
employment spells from the NLSY sample (see Appendix) in which the worker returns to a previous employer
during that spell of uninterrupted employment. A J1-J2 transition corresponds to the job-to-job transition away
from the employer which the worker subsequently returns to. A J2-J3 transition is the job-to-job transition
occurring when the worker returns to the employer. The employer in job J1 is the same as the employer in job
J3. However, the employer in job J2 from the J1-J2 transition is not necessarily the same as the employer in job
J2 when returning in a J2-J3 transition. Workers may hold jobs with several diﬀerent employers during the spell
before returning to the J1 employer.
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3 The Economic Environment
Time is continuous and goes on forever. A unit mass of risk neutral workers and a mass of
risk neutral ﬁrms with a common discount rate r > 0 maximize the expected sum of lifetime
consumption and proﬁt, respectively.
Firms operate using a constant returns to scale production technology which can accommo-
date any number of workers. Although many of the basic insights arise with identical workers
and ﬁrms, the initial speciﬁcation is more general and allows for diﬀerences in productivity per
worker across ﬁrms. In particular, suppose there are H ≥ 1 types of ﬁrms. Let γi > 0 (where
H∑
i=1
γi = 1) and xi > 0 (where xi > xj for all i > j) denote the proportion and productivity
respectively of type i = 1, ..., H ﬁrms.
Workers are homogeneous and characterized by their employment status and search capital.
An unemployed worker obtains and consumes z (x1 > z > 0) units of output. A worker employed
in a type i ﬁrm at wage w produces xi and consumes w. The worker’s search capital comes
from the number, n, and type of each employer contact, excluding the current employer or any
ﬁrm that the worker might have just met. Workers lose their ﬁrm contacts at a Poisson rate of
φ ≥ 0. The latter can be interpreted as the rate at which search capital depreciates.
Accumulation of employer contact arises as a by-product of job search. Unemployed job
seekers meet a randomly drawn ﬁrm at rate λ ≥ 0. Employed workers meet a randomly drawn
ﬁrm at rate sλ, where s ≥ 0 denotes the worker’s exogenous search intensity. To keep the
analysis simple, let n = 0, 1.10 Workers with an existing contact must therefore decide with
which ﬁrms to continue after a new meeting takes place.
After a meeting and a choice of ﬁrms (if any) takes place, a worker decides whether to solicit
job oﬀers or simply continue in the current state. If a worker decides to solicit job oﬀers, a
complete information auction immediately ensues among the available ﬁrms who make wage
bids for the worker’s service. An employed worker adds the ﬁrm that loses the auction to
the contacts list. If the worker transits from unemployment to employment, however, the ﬁrm
becomes an employer and does not count as a contact.11
At rate δ ≥ 0, an employed worker is exogenously displaced from the current job. When
a displacement occurs, the current employer receives a payoﬀ of zero and the worker can call
upon any existing contacts. If the worker accepts a job oﬀer from one of the contacts, the
worker moves from one employer to the other without an intervening spell of unemployment.
If the worker rejects all oﬀers (or if the worker did not have a contact), the worker becomes
unemployed.
To focus on the implications of search capital on the worker’s own outcomes alone, assume
10Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2011) analyze n > 1 in this economy without on-the-job search.
11The complete information assumption provides an important simpliﬁcation. If workers were uninformed about
productivity at the time of a meeting, then the auction will not necessarily reveal the productivity of the newly
met ﬁrm to the worker. Firms’ wage bids are not necessarily a monotonic function of their productivities. A low
wage bid might be associated with a high productivity ﬁrm because it oﬀers a steeper wage-tenure proﬁle (see
Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002). In this case workers’ beliefs about ﬁrms’ productivities (and how these beliefs
are formed) become crucial in determining their job acceptance strategies and choices of which ﬁrm to keep as a
contact. In a complete information environment these complications do not arise allowing an investigation of the
empirical facts described in Section 2 in a more tractable, albeit less realistic, framework.
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that workers do not pass on information about job opportunities to other workers. Further, to
simplify the notation and exposition assume the following
A.1 Unemployed workers or workers without a contact do not disregard a newly meet ﬁrm.
A.2 Given equal payoﬀs, the worker chooses employment over unemployment.
A.3 When an employed worker with a contact meets a new contact, the worker chooses to
proceed with the highest two productivity ﬁrms and breaks any tie in favour of incumbents,
that is, the current employer ﬁrst, the current contact second and the new contact third.12
A.4 In an auction in which the two ﬁrms make equally attractive wage oﬀers, the worker’s
tie breaking decision is to choose the higher productivity ﬁrm and randomly with equal
probability between equally productive ﬁrms.13
3.1 Workers payoﬀs
Let Ui be the payoﬀ to an unemployed worker who has a contact with a type i ﬁrm, i = 0, 1, ..., H,
where i = 0 corresponds to no contact. Let Eij(w) denote the payoﬀ to a worker earning wage
w in a type i ≥ 1 ﬁrm with contact j ≥ 0. The payoﬀ to unemployment can be written as
rU0 = z + λ
[
H∑
i=1
γimax{Ei0(wi0), Ui} − U0
]
,
where wi0 is the wage oﬀered by a type i ﬁrm to an unemployed worker with no contacts; and
rUi = z + λ
⎡
⎣ H∑
j=1
γj max{Eij(wij), Eji (wji ), Ui, Uj} − Ui
⎤
⎦+ φ [U0 − Ui] , i = 1, ..., H,
where wij is the wage oﬀered by a type i ﬁrm bidding against a type j ﬁrm. The max operator
contains the possible choices faced by an unemployed worker. For example, upon meeting a new
ﬁrm j an unemployed worker with a type i contact chooses between employment in either of the
two ﬁrms and staying unemployed with either ﬁrm as a contact. The last term of the Bellman
equation for Ui describes the expected loss from search capital depreciation.
When a worker earning wage w in a type i ≥ 1 ﬁrm with contact j ≥ 0 meets a type
k ≥ 1 ﬁrm, the worker also has several choices. There are six potential bilateral auctions among
the three ﬁrms.14 In addition, the worker can replace or keep the existing contact j without
holding a new auction, thereby still earning wage w at ﬁrm i. Allowing the worker to choose
unemployment with any of the three potential ﬁrms as contacts yields a total of eleven possible
12Formally, given an (i, j, k) employer-existing contact-new contact triple, the following sequencing occurs: (1)
if k ≤ min{i, j} continue with status quo; (2) else if i ≥ j, proceed with (i, k) and choose {Auction,NoAuction}
as outlined below and (3) else proceed to (j, k) auction.
13In an (i, j) auction in which Eij(w
i
j) = E
j
i (w
j
i ) as deﬁned below, the worker chooses max{i, j} and i with
probability 1/2 if i = j.
14To ease notation, ignore the option of opting for a one bidder auction when two are available.
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outcomes. The simplifying behavioural assumptions A.1-A.4 rule some of these options so that
in this situation, the payoﬀ is given by
Q(i, j, k, w) = max{Eik(wik), Eki (wki ), Eik(w), Ui, Uk} for k > j & i ≥ j
= max{Ejk(wjk), Ekj (wkj ), Uj , Uk} for k, j > i
= Eij(w) otherwise
Assuming without loss that following a φ shock the worker does not call a one bidder auction
with the current employer i, it follows that
rEij(w) = w + sλ
[
H∑
k=1
γkQ(i, j, k, w)− Eij(w)
]
+δ
[
max
{
Ej0(w
j
0), Uj
}
− Eij(w)
]
+ φ
[
max
{
Ei0(w), Ui
}− Eij(w)] ,
for i = 1, ..., H, j = 1, ..., H. For j = 0, there is no contact to lose, hence
rEi0(w) = w + sλ
[
H∑
k=1
γkQ(i, j, k, w)− Ei0(w)
]
+ δ
[
U0 − Ei0(w)
]
.
Like the value functions of the unemployed, these equations show that the value of employment
equals the ﬂow payoﬀ w plus the expected capital gain from accumulating search capital through
job search, plus the capital losses from displacement as well as from search capital depreciation.
3.2 Type i ﬁrm payoﬀs
Let J ij(w) denote the payoﬀ to a type i = 1, ..., H ﬁrm paying a wage w to an employee who
currently maintains a contact with a ﬁrm of type j = 0, 1, ..., H. Likewise let Cij denote the
value to a type i ﬁrm of being the contact for a worker employed at a type j ﬁrm. As above,
j = 0 corresponds to the situation where the worker does not have a current contact and hence
is unemployed.
A type i ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ as a lone bidder, that is in an auction with a worker with no
other contact, is then given by
M i0 = maxw
{I[Ei0(w) ≥ Ui](J i0(w)− Ci0)}+ Ci0,
where I is an indicator function that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm outbids the worker’s value
of unemployment and zero otherwise.
On the other hand, a type i ﬁrm’s expected value from engaging in an auction against a type
j ﬁrm bidding wji is
M ij = maxw
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
I[Eij(w) > max{Eji (wji ), Ui, Uj}](J ij(w)− Cij)
+I[Eij(w) = max{Eji (wji ), Ui, Uj}]ιij(J ij(w)− Cij)
+Cij
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ ,
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where ιij denotes the assumed tie breaking rule between equal payoﬀs in this auction speciﬁed in
A.4. Depending on productivity diﬀerences, some ﬁrms (the high productivity ones) may need
to outbid the payoﬀ to unemployment rather than the bid of a weak or comparatively very low
productivity opponent in order to obtain the worker’s services.
The payoﬀ to ﬁrm i of winning the auction and employing the worker, J ij(w), depends on the
subsequent worker’s strategy when meeting a new contact and whether to initiate an auction.
Suppose a worker currently being paid wage w at ﬁrm i with a type j contact meets a type
k > min{i, j} ﬁrm. If i ≥ j, then ﬁrm i will ultimately continue with the worker as either the
employer or the contact as implied by A.3 and A.4 so that
rJ ij(w) = x− w + sλ
⎡
⎣ H∑
k=j+1
γk[qM
i
k + (1− q)J ik(w)]− J ij(w)
⎤
⎦+ φ[J i0(w)− J ij(w)]− δJ ij(w),
where q denotes the worker’s decision to initiate an (i, k) auction. That is, q = 1 if max{Eik(wik), Eki (wki )}
> Eik(w) and q = 0 otherwise. If i < j, the relationship will end when the contact occurs. As-
suming again without loss that following a φ shock the worker does not call a one bidder auction
with its current employer i or become unemployed with i as the contact, it follows that
rJ ij(w) = x− w + φ[J i0(w)− J ij(w)]−
(
δ + sλ
H∑
k=i+1
γk
)
J ij(w).
Likewise, the payoﬀ to a type j = 1, ..., H ﬁrm of being a contact is given by
rCji = sλ
[
H∑
k=i+1
γk
(
M jk − Cji
)]
+ δ(M j0 − Cji )− φCji i < j,
= −
⎡
⎣sλ H∑
k=j+1
γk + φ
⎤
⎦Cji + δ(M j0 − Cji ) i ≥ j.
For worker contacts who are unemployed, i.e. i = 0, the worker accepts the new contact and
initiates an auction between ﬁrms j and k.
rCj0 = λ
[
H∑
k=1
γkM
j
k − Cj0
]
− φCj0 .
4 Equilibrium
Since the Eij(w) are strictly increasing in w, the worker’s best response strategy in an auction has
the reservation property for each (i, j) pair. Let a ﬁrm’s auction (pure) strategies or expected
bids be given by Σ = {wij} for i = 1, ..., H and j = 0, 1, ..., H, where, as deﬁned in Section 3.1,
wij is the oﬀer made by a type i ﬁrm bidding against a type j ﬁrm and again j = 0 corresponds
to no other contact or bidder. Denote Σ−wij as all bids except the particular paired ﬁrm i
′s bid
in an auction involving a type j ﬁrm. Given Σ−wij , deﬁne R
i
j as the wage that makes the worker
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indiﬀerent between accepting ﬁrm i’s oﬀer and the next best opportunity such that
Eij(R
i
j) = max{Eji (wji ), Ui, Uj}, i = 1, ...H, j = 1, ...H (1)
Ei0(R
i
0) = Ui, i = 1, ...H.
Note that by construction Rij is greater or equal to either R
i
0 or R
j
0 and that reservation wages
are not symmetric - Rij does not necessarily equal R
j
i .
Given the other ﬁrm’s bid as summarized in Σ−wij , the worker’s best response function to a
bid w from ﬁrm i is to accept all w > Rij . As assumed in A.2-A.4, for w
i
j = R
i
j the worker’s
tie breaking rule in an auction is to chose (i) employment over unemployment, (ii) the higher
productivity ﬁrm, that is i if i > j, (iii) and with equal probability if i = j.
Using the above insights, the bidding problem, M ij , for ﬁrm i competing against ﬁrm j can
then be re-written in terms of the reservation wages:
M ij = maxw
{
I[w > Rij ](J
i
j(w)− Cij) + I[w = Rij ]ιij(J ij(w)− Cij) + Cij
}
. (2)
Also note that since xi > xi′ for all i > i
′, it follows J ij(w) ≥ J i
′
j (w) and C
i
j ≥ Ci
′
j . More
productive ﬁrms can always replicate the behaviour of less productive ﬁrms and earn more
proﬁt.
Given the tie breaking rule in an i, j auction, any ﬁrm i ≤ j will bid more than Rij , up to the
wage that makes i indiﬀerent between hiring and continuing the relationship with the worker
as a contact. That is, the best response strategy is to bid up to where the oﬀer w satisﬁes
J ij(w) = C
i
j ≤ Cji . On the other hand, if i > j, ﬁrm i will win the auction by simply oﬀering
Rij . In this case, the best response strategy is to oﬀer the reservation bid w
i
j = R
i
j up to where
J ij(w
i
j) = C
i
j ≥ Cji = J ji (wji ). The Bertrand competition just described implies that ﬁrm i ≤ j
increases its bid until J ij(w
i
j) = C
i
j whereas ﬁrm j bids R
j
i . Since R
j
i ≥ Rj0, for all i, it follows
that wji ≥ wj0 = Rj0.
The above arguments imply that the optimal wage oﬀered in a one bidder auction is the
reservation wage for continuing search with a contact i, wi0 = R
i
0, provided J
i
0(R
i
0) > C
i
0 such
that
J i0(w
i
0) = J
i
0(R
i
0) = M
i
0.
In a two bidder auction, the less productive ﬁrm optimally bids up to the point where it is
indiﬀerent between employing and being a contact. The wage oﬀered by ﬁrm i in a two bidder
auction wij then solves
J ij(w
i
j) = C
i
j = M
i
j .
The more productive ﬁrm j optimally matches the payoﬀ to the worker of the less productive
ﬁrm’s wage bid and then the worker chooses ﬁrm j and the oﬀer wji = R
j
i . Here
J ji (w
j
i ) = J
j
i (R
j
i ) = M
j
i ≥ Cji ,
with strict inequality for j > i. If j′s best response makes the worker indiﬀerent between i and
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j, by construction wij = R
i
j provided E
i
j(w
i
j) ≥ Uj and hence
J ij(w
i
j) = J(R
i
j) = C
i
j = M
i
j .
In this case, Σ = R. If not, wij solves J
i
j(w
i
j) = C
i
j .
These reservation wages and bidding strategies induce the worker to initiate an auction if
and only if it leads to strictly preferred outcomes, that is if Q(i, j, k, w) > Eimax{j,k}(w). Using
the above arguments we now deﬁne an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition: An equilibrium is a set of reservation wages and wage oﬀers R,Σ such that under
the tie breaking rules described in A.2-A.4
(i) Rij satisﬁes the worker’s reservation value in (1) given Σ for i = 1, ..., H, j = 0, 1, ....H.
(ii) wij solves the ﬁrm’s problem described by M
i
j in (2) given R, Σ−wij , for i = 1, ..., H, j =
0, 1, ....H.
(iii) a worker employed by ﬁrm i at wage w initiates an auction if and only if max{Eij(Rij), Eji (Rji )} >
Eij(w).
5 Homogeneous Firms
To highlight the main economic mechanisms of the model in a tractable and transparent way,
we analyse the case in which all ﬁrms are homogeneous (H = 1 and x1 = x). In this case it is
not necessary to identify ﬁrm types. Superscripts can be suppressed and subscripts for contacts
are now {0, 1}.
The expected payoﬀ for a ﬁrm in an auction without a competitor is
M0 = max
w
{I[w ≥ R0](J0(w)− C0)}+ C0.
The ﬁrm’s expected value from an auction with a worker who is unemployed with one contact
or is employed with no contacts is
M1 = max
w
{
I[w > R1](J1(w)− C1) + I[w = R1]
(
J1(w)− C1
2
)}
+ C1,
where the other bidding ﬁrm oﬀers the worker’s reservation wage in this auction, w−1 = R1, a
wage that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent (J1(R1) = C1) about hiring the worker. In this situation,
the best response strategy (w0, w1) is to oﬀer the reservation wages (R0, R1). Hence, the ﬁrm’s
strategies (w0, w1) imply M0 = J0(w0) and M1 = J1(w1) = C1, where J0(w0), J1(w1), C1 and
C0 are given by
rJ0(w0) = x− w0 + sλ[J1(w1)− J(w0)]− δJ0(w0)
rJ1(w1) = x− w1 − δJ1(w1)
rC1 = δ(M0 − C1)− φC1
rC0 = λ(M1 − C0)− φC0.
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Given these bidding strategies, the expected value of an unemployed worker with a contact
and the expected payoﬀ in a two bidder auction simpliﬁes to
rU0 = z + λ [E0(w0)− U0]
rU1 = z + λ [E1(w1)− U1] + φ [U0 − U1] ,
whereas the expected value of employment at any wage w satisﬁes
rE0(w) = w + sλ [max{E1(w), E1(w1)} − E0(w)] + δ [U0 − E0(w)]
rE1(w) = w + sλ [max{E1(w), E1(w1)} − E1(w)]
+δ [E0(w0)− E1(w)] + φ [max {E0(w0), E0(w)} − E1(w)] .
For E1(w1), the worker does not beneﬁt from on-the-job search. Thus when a worker with a job
and a contact meets another ﬁrm, the worker receives no capital gain and disregards the new
contact.
Using the above value functions and ﬁrms’ indiﬀerence condition in an auction with two
bidders gives the following result.
Lemma 1: If all ﬁrms have the same productivity, the wage oﬀered in an auction with two
bidders is given by
w1 =
(r + φ)(r + δ + sλ)
(r + φ)(r + δ + sλ) + δ(r + δ)
x+
δ(r + δ)
(r + φ)(r + δ + sλ) + δ(r + δ)
w0.
Relative to sequential auction models without recall (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002), the new
feature here is that the oﬀered w1 is strictly below x. With search capital ﬁrms have a positive
value of holding on to a contact; i.e. C1 > 0. Over time employed workers experience job
destruction shocks. Workers will call upon their contact (if any) to avoid unemployment. In
such a case, the contacted ﬁrm is in the desirable situation where it faces no competition from
other ﬁrms and hence can extract monopsony rents from the worker by paying w0.
15 This recall
implies a positive weight on w0 in the above equation as the value to the ﬁrm of not hiring the
worker (and waiting for a job displacement and a subsequent wage of w0) is decreasing in w0.
In an auction with just one bidder, the worker (without a contact) gets oﬀered w0 = R0
making the worker indiﬀerent between accepting the job and searching with a contact, i.e.,
E0(w1) = U1. This condition leads to Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: If all ﬁrms have the same productivity, the indiﬀerence condition faced by unem-
ployed workers with no contacts yields
w0 = ϕw1 + (1− ϕ)z,
15In the more general case of n > 1, the contacted ﬁrms will face less competition for the worker than they
faced in the last auction and oﬀer the worker a lower wage.
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where
ϕ =
λ[(r + λ+ δ)− s(r + λ+ φ)]
(r + δ + φ)(r + λ+ φ) + λ(r + λ)
< 1.
Note that ϕ is decreasing with search intensity as there is a “foot-in-the-door” eﬀect at
play. Unemployed workers are prepared to accept a wage below z as an investment for the
wage growth that arises from engaging their future employers and poaching ﬁrms in Bertrand
competition. See Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). With search capital, however, the possibility
of accumulating employment contacts tempers this foot-in-the-door eﬀect thereby increasing w0.
Given that unemployed workers have the option to continue searching and increasing their wage
when meeting another contact, a ﬁrm must compensate workers for giving up this option. The
relative importance of these channels pins down the sign of ϕ and hence whether w0 is above z
or not.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 gives the following result.
Proposition 1: The wages oﬀered in an equilibrium with homogeneous ﬁrms are:
w1 = αx+ (1− α)z and w0 = βx+ (1− β)z,
where
α =
(r + φ)(r + δ + sλ)
(r + φ)(r + δ + sλ) + (1− ϕ)δ(r + δ) ,
β = ϕα and w1 > w0.
The above equations reveal the eﬀects on equilibrium wages of an increase in the rate at which
workers meet contacts, s, and the rate at which they loose them, φ. For example, diﬀerentiation
implies that ∂w1/∂φ > 0. This result is quite intuitive. As search capital depreciates faster, the
ﬁrm’s value of holding on to contact is lower. There is a higher chance that the worker might
not recall the ﬁrm by the time a job destruction shock hits the worker. Since this also implies
that the ﬁrm’s value of employing a worker is now higher, ﬁrms would be willing to bid more to
attract workers.
The sign of ∂w0/∂φ is, however, ambiguous. A higher φ increases w0 through its eﬀect on w1.
On the other hand, a higher φ reduces w0 through its eﬀect on ϕ. As search capital depreciates
faster, the option value to continue searching for another contact becomes less important, thereby
decreasing ϕ. The relative strengths of these forces then pins down the net eﬀect of φ on w0.
Diﬀerentiation also establishes that λ(φ − δ) + φ(r + φ) < 0 is necessary and suﬃcient to
guarantee ∂w1/∂s < 0, and is suﬃcient to guarantee ∂w0/∂s < 0. When workers are able to
hold on to their contacts for a relatively long time (i.e φ close to zero), a higher s implies a lower
w0 through the foot-in-the-door eﬀect. This eﬀect in turn increases the ﬁrm’s value of holding
a contact and puts downward pressure on w1. At higher values of φ, these eﬀects are weaker
and an increase in s leads to stronger competition between ﬁrms in the auction, thereby putting
upward pressure on w1 and consequently on w0.
Further, J0(w0) > C0 > 0 implies ﬁrms strictly prefer to hire an unemployed worker at the
ﬁrst meeting rather than keeping the worker as a contact. In a two bidder auction, J1(w1) =
C1 > 0 implies ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between hiring the worker and keeping the worker as an
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employed contact and hence there is no proﬁtable deviation. These arguments establish existence
and uniqueness.
Theorem 1: The reservation strategies (R0, R1) and the oﬀer strategies (w0, w1) describe the
unique symmetric equilibrium with homogeneous ﬁrms. Employed workers without a contact
search on-the-job and initiate a two bidder auction when they meet another potential employer.
6 Unemployment and Output
In conventional job search models with homogeneous agents, employed job seekers are rent seek-
ers who move from job to job for higher pay without an accompanying increase in production. If
reshuﬄing workers across employers is costly in these environments, on-the-job search becomes
socially wasteful.16 This ineﬃciency does not apply here - there are no search costs. There
are, however, other potential consequences associated with job-to-job turnover. In particular,
on-the-job search can alter output as (a) employed workers compete with (crowd out) unem-
ployed workers for available employment opportunities and (b) ﬁrm entry responds to changes
in matching rates, wages and the anticipated duration of employment.
In contrast, on-the-job search in the economy presented here takes on a productive aspect - it
generates back-up job opportunities that partially insure workers when they become displaced.
Establishing contacts with potential employers through job hunting enables workers to avoid
costly unemployment spells when they separate from their current employer. The beneﬁts of
this insurance depend on the accumulation and depreciation rates of search capital, so s and φ
become focal parameters for evaluating the impact of on-the-job search in this framework.
To assess these eﬀects we extend the model with homogeneous ﬁrms described in the previous
section by ﬁrst endogenising the arrival rate through a matching technology and then by allowing
ﬁrm entry and exit. Let u denote the number of unemployed job seekers, e0 the number of
employed workers without a contact and e1 the number of employed workers with a contact
so that u + e0 + e1 = 1. In a steady state, ﬂows across these three states balance such that
(δ + φ)e1 = sλe0 and δe0 = λu leading to the steady state measures
u =
δ(δ + φ)
(δ + φ)(δ + λ) + sλ2
, e0 =
λ(δ + φ)
(δ + φ)(δ + λ) + sλ2
, e1 =
sλ2
(δ + φ)(δ + λ) + sλ2
. (3)
The 1− u employed workers produce x whereas the unemployed contribute z. Deﬁne gross
output as p = x(1− u) + zu. Let f denote the number of ﬁrms producing as well as recruiting
workers. Firms in this framework are a collection of jobs that can be either vacant or occupied
and producing. To be economically active and recruit workers, ﬁrms must pay a ﬁxed ﬂow cost
k each period. Steady state net output y - the standard measure of welfare in matching models
- is then y = p− kf .
16Models with on-the-job search may be more eﬃcient than the competitive outcome without on-the-job search.
For example, adding on-the-job search as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) relieves the outcome of the Diamond
paradox (Diamond, 1971).
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6.1 Crowding Out
Employed workers searching for another job opportunity, the e0 and e1 workers, can interfere
with the search outcomes of unemployed job seekers, the u jobless workers.17 To allow for
this behavior, assume search is undirected with random encounters between workers and ﬁrms
so that unemployed and employed workers are substitutes in the search process.18 Following
conventional speciﬁcations, suppose a Cobb Douglas technology with constant returns to scale
governs the way in which job seekers meet potential job opportunities so that the number of
work-ﬁrm meetings is:
M(u+ se0 + se1, f) = M(u+ s(1− u), f) = Af1/σ(u+ s(1− u))(1−1/σ),
where A is an eﬃciency parameter and 1/σ ∈ [0, 1] is the elasticity of the job ﬁnding rate. In
this environment, the number of meetings occurring between ﬁrms and job seekers of both types
depends on the extent of on-the-job search captured by s. Employed workers compete with
unemployed job seekers in the matching process slowing the escape rate out of unemployment.
Assume for now that the number of ﬁrms f is ﬁxed, a speciﬁcation that aligns with the
conventional notion of the short run. Fixing f is not equivalent to ﬁxing the number of jobs or
vacancies as ﬁrms can maintain contacts as they hire other workers. If a ﬁrm meets a worker
with a job and becomes the contact of the worker, this relationship does not impede the ﬁrm’s
capacity to hire other workers at any point. The value functions are consistent with this set up
as is the exogenous speciﬁcation for the decay of search capital φ which is independent of ﬁrm
matching and hiring rates.19
The corresponding arrival rate is
λ = M(u+ s(1− u), f)/(u+ s(1− u)) = A[f/(u+ s(1− u))]1/σ. (4)
Implicit diﬀerentiation and manipulation gives
∂λ
∂s
=
−λ2[δ + φ+ sλ− (1− s)λu]
σ[(δ + φ)(δ + sλ) + s2λ2]− (1− s)(δ + φ+ 2sλ)λu,
which is negative as both the denominator and the numerator term in brackets are positive.
Total diﬀerentiation of unemployment above gives
∂u
∂s
=
−u
(δ + φ)(δ + λ) + sλ2
[
λ2 + (δ + φ+ 2sλ)
∂λ
∂s
]
=
−λ2u
(δ + φ)(δ + λ) + sλ2
[
(σ − 1)[(δ + φ)(δ + sλ) + s2λ2]− (δ + φ)(φ+ 2sλ)− s2λ2
σ[(δ + φ)(δ + sλ) + s2λ2]− (1− s)(δ + φ+ 2sλ)λu
]
.
17The model speciﬁes that all employed workers search including those with a contact. This speciﬁcation eases
exposition in the general case but does not alter the basic results derived here. Restricting on-the-job search to
those without contacts does not materially aﬀect outcomes.
18In directed search models with on-the-job search (Delacroix and Shi, 2006, for example), employed and
unemployed workers search for jobs in diﬀerent submarkets and any crowing out eﬀect between these workers
disappears.
19Although specifying a ﬁxed number of jobs is conceptually awkward given recall, naive speciﬁcations with
u = v yield similar results to those found here.
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As u governs output for a ﬁxed f , the term
σ − 2 + (δ + φ)(δ − φ− sλ)
(δ + φ)(δ + sλ) + s2λ2
(5)
determines the impact of on-the-job search on unemployment and output. For suﬃciently small
φ and small s, allowing workers to increase the extent of on-the-job search with recall via s lowers
unemployment. Since the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, p and y rise with s. On the other hand, if
employed workers do not hold onto their contacts suﬃciently well (for φ large), crowding out
outweighs backstopping from recall. As φ → ∞ recall disappears, the model converges to the
homogeneous version of the Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) model in which on-the-job search
reduces p and y. It is worth noting that given (i) symmetric matching (σ = 2) coupled with (ii)
a contact destruction rate weakly greater than the job destruction rates (φ ≥ δ), unemployment
increases for all s > 0. The parameter values in Table 5 below satisfy these two conditions
implying that in the calibrated model without entry, unemployment rises and output (both p
and y) fall as s increases.
A similar but simpler exercise establishes that ∂p/∂φ = ∂y/∂φ < 0. This result is quite
natural. A decline in the insurance component from an increased φ lowers output.
6.2 Job Creation
With a ﬁxed number of agents, workers and ﬁrms have limited opportunities to adjust behavior
in response to matching rates or wage changes as s or φ vary. Allowing a participation response
through entry and exit enables ﬁrms to react to wages and matching thereby further altering
unemployment and output. This response, which aligns with conventional notions of the long
run, causes the interactions among the endogenous variables λ, u, e0, e1, w and now f to become
more complex.20
With contacts and hired workers present, the zero proﬁt condition in this model diﬀers from
the familiar expression relating to the value of a vacancy. See Pissarides (2001). Recall that
ﬁrms use a constant returns to scale production technology that enables them to acquire and
maintain contacts independently of the number of workers currently working with the ﬁrm. As
such, entry and exit become tied to the payoﬀs of employing a given worker and of holding
contacts. In a steady state of this economy, there are e0+e1 workers at any point in time evenly
allocated across f ﬁrms each paying operating costs k. Steady state proﬁt ﬂow at each ﬁrm is
thus given by
π = (x− w0)e0/f + (x− w1)e1/f − k. (6)
Participation through entry or exit drives ﬂow proﬁts to zero, π = 0, and determines the
20It is possible but conceptually less transparent and meaningful to ﬁx λ and let f be endogenous. Doing so
restricts matching to be independent of unemployment, employment and the number of ﬁrms. Moreover, as wages
are now allocating resources, the impact of parameter changes works through wages as well as employment.
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amount of job creation in the economy.21 Substitution and manipulation then gives
kf
x− z =
λ(1− ϕ(1/σ))(δ + φ) + sλ2(1− 1/σ)
(δ + λ)(δ + φ) + sλ2
. (7)
A free entry equilibrium further includes a (λ, f) pair solving equations (4) and (7). Wages
follow from Proposition 1 whereas employment and unemployment levels follow from equations
(3). Gross and net output are given by the same expressions as above.
Analytic solutions and hence comparative static results are elusive for any free entry equilib-
ria. We therefore calibrate the model to analyse the eﬀects of search capital on unemployment
and output with endogenous entry. Let the time period to be a month and r = 0.0041, corre-
sponding to a 5% annual interest rate. Following Shimer (2005), normalize the common ﬁrm
productivity x = 1 and set the ﬂow payoﬀ of unemployment and the ﬂow cost of posting a va-
cancy to be 40% and 20% of ﬁrm productivity, respectively. Following Pissarides and Petrongolo
(2001), set σ = 2 so that the elasticity of the job ﬁnding rate equals 0.5.
Minimizing the percentage squared diﬀerence between the simulated and empirical moments
described in Table 4 recovers the remaining four parameters Ω = {δ, A, s, φ}. Following Horn-
stein et al. (2011), the monthly UE transition target rate is 0.43, whereas the EE and EU
transition target rates are 0.033 and 0.03, respectively. The NLSY provides the ﬁnal two targets
- (i) the ratio of self reported voluntary and involuntary EE transitions and (ii) the proportion
of spells with at least one return (1,619) divided by the total number of employment spells
(26,094) - which correspond to the relative number of moves from new contacts relative to job
destruction moves and the probability of an employer return following a job loss (see Table 1).
The estimated results and their implications are discussed below.
6.3 Firm Heterogeneity
The eﬀect of search capital on output and unemployment expand under ﬁrm heterogeneity. On-
the-job search increases match productivity as workers improve the “quality” of their contacts
in terms of future wage and productivity growth. To gauge this impact, let H = 2.22 With two
types of ﬁrms there are four diﬀerent bids in competitive two ﬁrm auctions and an equilibrium
corresponds to the solution of 36 linear equations in 36 unknowns.23
21The requirement that free-entry ﬂow proﬁts equal zero is purely to keep the analysis tractable. This condition
can be derived when interpreting r as a “death” shock for ﬁrms instead of an interest rate.
22In this setting, workers who meet a potential employer continue with the contact if and only if the new option
strictly improves payoﬀs. They do not replace existing contacts with similar ones. Workers with a type 1 employer
and a type 1 contact do not change arrangements when they meet another type 1 ﬁrm. This assumption does
not aﬀect the individual worker’s payoﬀ, but it does alter the ﬁrm’s return to job creation as this behavior by the
worker alters the likelihood of the ﬁrm separating from an existing contact or worker as well as the likelihood of
being asked to bid after a meeting takes place. Workers might want to collectively commit to swapping contacts
around and thereby lowering the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ to holding a contact. It is uncertain if subsequent ﬁrm exit oﬀsets
these gains. In any case, an  small switching cost rules out this behavior.
23Firms oﬀer reservation wages Rij , i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2. There are also two wages oﬀered in a monopsonistic
auction, R10 and R
2
0. Because the worker’s contacts can come and go without a wage change from an auction,
some of these Rij wages will appear in non (i, j) employment states. Accounting for all the possible observed
contact changes without auctions as well as the oﬀ-the-equilibrium path payoﬀs to E12(R
1
2), U1, U2 yields ﬁfteen
Bellman equations. For ﬁrms, the same accounting exercise yields a corresponding twelve J ij(w) equations - three
of which are oﬀ the equilibrium path, along with C11 , C
1
2 and C
2
2 . In addition there are six equilibrium restrictions
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To solve for this equilibrium, set x1 = 1 and let γ1 = 0.75 (γ2 = 0.25) capture the decreasing
right tail typically found in ﬁrm productivity distributions (Lentz and Mortensen, 2008, Postel-
Vinay and Robin, 2002, and Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). Matching the Hornstein et al. (2011)
measure of frictional wage dispersion, a mean-min or Mm ratio of 1.7, recovers x2. The rest of
the parameters Ω = {δ, A, s, φ} are obtained using the same moments as in the homogeneous
case.24
Table 4: Target Moments
Model
Moments Data Homogenous Heterogenous
UE 0.43 0.430 0.428
EU 0.030 0.030 0.031
EE 0.033 0.035 0.033
Vol/Inv EE 1.5 1.492 1.583
Prob. Return 0.062 0.061 0.066
Mm ratio∗ 1.71 1.111 1.710
∗This moment is not targeted in the homogeneous case.
6.4 Calibration
Table 4 shows that both the homogeneous and heterogeneous models ﬁt their respective target
moments very well. Table 5 shows the corresponding parameter values. Note that ﬁrm hetero-
geneity allows the model to match the observed wage dispersion with minimal impact on the
estimated values of δ, φ or s. The higher value of A (higher matching eﬃciency) is required to
match the job ﬁnding rate of the unemployed under ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Table 5: Parameters
Model δ A s φ x2
Homogenous 0.0442 0.4137 0.1722 0.1124 1.0000
Heterogeneous 0.0439 0.5360 0.1567 0.1102 4.0865
Now consider the impact of search capital on output given these parameters. Figure 1 shows
the eﬀect of increasing search intensity s and hence the rate of search capital accumulation on
unemployment and net output (y = p−kf). In the calibrated models, an increase in s decreases
the EU rate as more workers are able to call upon a contact to avoid unemployment. Although
the crowding out eﬀect decreases λ when ﬁrms are homogeneous, this eﬀect is not suﬃciently
strong and unemployment falls.25 This implies that gross output p also increases with search
intensity s in both cases.
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1(R
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1), which are also linear in
Rij .
24Equilibrium outcomes are found by ﬁrst suitably adapting (4) and (7) to endogenise λ and f for heterogenous
ﬁrms and then by again following an iterative procedure. For any (s, φ) pair, solve the 36 linear equations for an
arbitrary matching rate λ. The corresponding steady state employment levels imply a new arrival rate. Iterating
until a ﬁxed point emerges ﬁnds the equilibrium.
25The crowding out eﬀect does not reduce λ when ﬁrms are heterogeneous because ﬁrm entry is much stronger
in this case.
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Figure 1: Changes in u and y as s increases
The critical factor driving the decline in net output given homogeneous ﬁrms is the behaviour
of operating costs kf relative to gross production p. Since ﬁrm entry also increases with s, so
does the total cost they pay to be economically active, kf . Under ﬁrm heterogeneity, the extent
to which workers avoid unemployment and become employed in high productive ﬁrms generate
increases in p that outweigh the increases in kf , making p and y more responsive to changes in
s when ﬁrms are heterogeneous.
7 Implications for Employment Transitions
Search capital generates worker mobility consistent with the patterns observed in the NLSY, as
described in Section 2. Employer returns observed in the model and in the data occur within
the same employment spell as shown in Table 4. In the model, workers who experience a job
destruction shock call upon their existing employment contacts to avoid unemployment. This
generates involuntary job-to-job transitions. Since the new auction has a lower number of bidders
than the auction that gave them their last wage, these workers start their new jobs at a lower
wage. These involuntary employer returns accompanied by earnings losses are consistent with
the evidence on J1-J2 and J2-J3 transitions presented in Tables 2 and 3.26
Search capital also creates diﬀerentials in the probability of a job-to-job transition and in
the probability of a job-to-unemployment transition. Workers who accumulate more search
capital (due to more time spent in on-the-job search), have a lower probability of experiencing
26Table 3 also shows that relatively small but positive earnings changes occur when comparing J1 earnings with
J3 earnings. This feature is also qualitatively consistent with the predictions of an extended model with n > 1.
Consider the case when n = H = 2. Let wL0 denote the wage paid by a low productivity ﬁrm to a worker just
hired out of unemployment. If this worker then meets a high productivity ﬁrm, Bertrand competition implies the
worker will earn wHL > w
L
0 and keep the L ﬁrm as a contact. Conditional on keeping such a contact and adding
to the contact list another L ﬁrm, Bertrand competition implies this worker will earn a wage wLL > w
L
0 following
a job destruction shock at the H ﬁrm. If the job destruction event involved an employer return, the wage pattern
shown is consistent with the evidence presented in Table 3. For this result to hold it is necessary to have n > 1
as with n = 1 the J1 and J3 earnings are the same.
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unemployment and a higher probability of experiencing a job-to-job transition than workers
with less search capital.
As search capital is unobservable in the data, we use the cumulative number of job transitions
during an uninterrupted employment spell as a measure of search capital accumulation. The
model predicts that workers with more jobs during an employment spell will have accumulated
more search capital. Given this proxy measure, the probability of becoming unemployed (an
EU event) is lower for workers with more jobs during the spell, while the probability of a job-to-
job transition (an EE event) increases with the number of jobs accumulated prior to the event
during the spell.
To see these relationships formally, consider the case in which all ﬁrms are homogeneous as
described in Section 5. Let mi,j denote the measure of workers with i = 1, 2 jobs and j = 0, 1
contacts. Steady state turnover implies that the measure of workers with one job is given by
m1 = m1,0 +m1,1, where m1,0 and m1,1 solve the system
m1,0 =
λu+ φm1,1
sλ+ δ
and m1,1 =
sλm1,0
2(φ+ δ)
,
given an unemployment rate u > 0. The measure of workers with two jobs is given by m2 =
m2,0 +m2,1, where m2,0 and m2,1 solve the system
m2,0 =
δm1,1 + φm2,1
sλ+ δ
and m2,1 =
sλ(m2,0 +m1,1)
2(φ+ δ)
,
given m1,1 > 0. Using the parameter values in Table 5 and noting that in the calibrated model
u = 0.065, m1,1/m1 = 0.18 < m2,1/m2 = 0.44. The share of workers holding one contact among
those that are in their ﬁrst job is lower than among those who are in their second job.
The job-to-job transition probability for those workers who have had i = 1, 2 jobs during the
employment spell is then given by
Pr(EE|i) = (sλ/2)mi,0 + δmi,1
mi
,
while the employment to unemployment transition probability for those who have had i = 1, 2
jobs is given by
Pr(EU |i) = δmi,0
mi
.
Given the parameter values above, the monthly probabilities are Pr(EE|1) = 0.034 < Pr(EE|2) =
0.037 and Pr(EU |1) = 0.035 > Pr(EU |2) = 0.024.27 A similar result obtains in the model with
ﬁrm heterogeneity.
To assess these implications and estimate the probability of ending a job spell in the NLSY
sample, consider the following competing risks model for EE and EU events:
Pr(Eventt) = θ
′
1(Cumulative number of jobs in spell up to t) + Θ
′(Controls) + , (8)
27Conditional on a job separation the job-to-job transition probability is then given by Pr(EE|i, sep) =
(sλ/2)mi,0+δmi,1
mi(sλmi,0/2mi+δ)
, such that Pr(EE|1, sep) = 0.518 < Pr(EE|2, sep) = 0.624.
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where the date t is measured in months and the reference category is no EE or EU transition.
Table 6: Probability that a job spell ends
EE EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jobs in spell
1 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
2 0.036∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
3 0.040∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
4 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
5 0.041∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
6 or more 0.042∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
N 1,163,346 954,467 1,163,346 954,467
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes The table reports the ﬁtted probabilities of job loss (based
on Mlogit regressions using the NLSY sample) given the previous
number of jobs in the employment spell. Columns (1) and (3) are
estimated simultaneously controlling only for job tenure, whereas
columns (2) and (4) use additional controls. See Appendix for de-
tails. In the left two columns, the job loss does not end the employ-
ment spell. In the right two columns, the spell ends in unemploy-
ment.
Table 6 reports the ﬁtted probabilities based on the estimated coeﬃcients and setting all
the covariate values equal to their corresponding means. Columns (1) and (3) are estimated
simultaneously controlling only for job tenure, while columns (2) and (4) are the simultaneous
estimates with additional controls for workers’ experience, education, gender, union membership,
marital status, public sector employment, industrial sector, part time work, urban residence and
region. The Appendix provides further details of the speciﬁcation used and the full set of
estimated parameters for the controls.
The left two columns present the results from the estimation of the probability of observing
a job separation which does not end the employment spell. In the right two columns, the spell
ends in unemployment. The pattern of the ﬁtted probabilities conform with the predictions of
the search capital model. Workers with more previously held jobs during an employment spell
have progressively higher (lower) probabilities of experiencing an EE (EU) transition.28
The search capital model further implies that the probability of ending an employment spell
is positively correlated with the number of employer returns and with the number of involuntary
transitions during an employment spell. These transitions depreciate workers’ search capital and
hence increase the probability of ending the employment spell after a δ shock. To empirically
evaluate these implications, we estimate the probability of an EU transition once again using
the NLSY sample.
Table 7 reports the estimated marginal eﬀects.29 Columns (1) and (2) show that the proba-
bility of ending an employment spell is increasing in the number of returns and in the number of
involuntary transitions the worker has had during the employment spell, respectively, after con-
28The EE probability for those workers with one job is much lower than the EE probabilities for those workers
with more than one job. Since most of the individuals in the NLSY sample did not experience an EE transition
during an employment spell (see Table 1), this composition eﬀect dampens the estimated value of Pr(EE|1).
29Table 7 presents marginal eﬀects based on estimating a linear probability model (LPM). These estimates are
very similar to the ones obtained using a probit or a clog-log model.
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Table 7: Probability that an employment spell ends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employer returns
1 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0002
2 0.0021∗∗ 0.0021∗
3 or more 0.0008 -0.0007
Involuntary job transitions
1 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
2 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗
3 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0009
4 or more 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0018
Constant 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0611∗∗∗ 0.0654∗∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗
N 954,467
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes The table reports the marginal eﬀects of the number of prior employer returns and of the
number of involuntary transitions on the probability of a job loss into unemployment from a linear
probability model using the NLSY sample. Columns (1) and (2) control for job tenure and the
number of jobs in the spell. Columns (3) and (4) control for experience, education, gender, union
membership, marital status, public sector employment, industrial sector, part time work, urban
residence and region.
trolling for job tenure and the number of jobs in the spell (as suggested by Table 6). Columns
(3) and (4) show that although weaker, these results also hold after controlling for workers’
experience, education, gender, union membership, marital status, public sector employment,
industrial sector, part time work, urban residence and region.30
The proposed explanation for the estimates presented in Tables 6 and 7 is that workers
accumulate and depreciate search capital during an employment spell. In contrast, standard
job ladder models like Burdett and Mortensen (1998) or Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) are
inconsistent with the evidence on employer returns presented in Section 2 and the results of
Table 6. In these models, the more jobs that workers have within an employment spell indicate
that they are closer to the top of the job ladder and hence have a lower probability of ﬁnding
a better job to move up into. That is, in these models the probability of experiencing an EE
transition decreases with the number of previous jobs held during an employment spell. Further,
since job destruction shocks aﬀect all matches equally, the probability of an EU transition is
independent of the number of jobs the worker has had during the employment spell.
Pinheiro and Visschers (2015) and Jarosh (2015) propose extensions to the Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) models, respectively, in which moving
to more and more stable jobs through on-the-job search decreases the probability of an EU
transition. Although these models generate a negative relationship between the number of
previous jobs held within and employment spell and the probability of an EU transition, they do
not account for the positive relationship between the number of previous jobs in the employment
spell and the probability of an EE transition.
30Alternative speciﬁcations ﬁnd that the positive correlation between the probability of an EU transition and
the number of returns or the number of involuntary transitions remains after controlling simultaneously for the
number of returns and the number of involuntary transitions (with and without additional controls). In addition,
we ﬁnd that the probability of an EE transition decreases with the number of involuntary transitions.
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Moreover, none of these models provides an explanation for why the probability of an EU
transition increases with the number of involuntary job transitions or the number of returns
workers have had during the employment spell. Search capital depreciation, however, provides a
natural interpretation. Involuntary job losses compel workers to use their contacts to avoid un-
employment. Workers who consume more search capital become more likely to make transitions
to unemployment thereby accounting for these ﬁndings.
8 Conclusion
This paper puts forward the concept of search capital to provide an endogenous explanation of
return employment as documented in Section 2. Workers who experience a job destruction shock
can call upon their existing employment contacts and avoid unemployment. Return employment
occurs when the worker chooses one of his or her previous employers after a job destruction shock.
Since the new auction has a lower number of bidders than the auction that gave these workers
their last wage, these workers start their new job at the old employer with lower earnings.
Given that the amount of search capital is correlated with the number of jobs held during an
employment spell, the model predicts that the probability of a job-to-job transition is positively
correlated with the number of jobs previously held during an employment spell whereas the
probability of a job-to-unemployment transition is negatively correlated. The model also predicts
that the probability of a job-to-unemployment transition is positively correlated with the number
of involuntary transitions and with the number of returns a worker experiences during the
employment spell. Evidence from the NLSY supports all of these predictions and stands in
contrast with standard job ladder models like Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002).
The search capital framework is also related to the large empirical literature demonstrating
that informal employment contacts based on individuals’ social or professional networks have
a strong inﬂuence on their labour market outcomes. Holzer (1988), for example, ﬁnds that
66 percent of young workers who accepted a job used informal search channels. Capellari and
Tatsiramos (2011) show that informal employment contacts have positive eﬀects on workers’ job
ﬁnding rates, while Brown et al. (2013) show that such contacts lead to better job matches.
Theoretical frameworks that followed on from these ﬁndings formalise the idea that contacts
help alleviate search frictions that arise from imperfect information about the location of jobs
and workers and the idea that contacts help mitigate asymmetric information about the quality
of applicants in the hiring process. See Topa (2001), Montgomery (1991) and Galenianos (2013),
among others.
Information ﬂows among the members of a given network lie at the heart of most of these
theories. In particular, a prominent assumption made in models that consider employed and
unemployed workers’ job search is that individuals will always pass along information about
job opportunities to their contacts (see Calvo´-Armengol, 2004, Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson,
2004, Fontaine, 2008, among others) or will pass along such information if the job opportunity
is less attractive than the current job (see Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994, Calvo´-Armengol
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and Jackson, 2007, among others). The search capital framework considers an alternative,
complementary environment in which job seekers keep and hold the information they acquire
about job opportunities as insurance in the event of a job destruction shock.
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Appendix: Data and Estimation
NLSY Data
Following Light and McGarry (1998) and Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2015), the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) sample of white male and female workers used throughout
the paper drops workers
• with indeterminate entry dates,
• with entry dates that preceded their 16th birthday or the earliest date included in the time
frame of the regressions (January 1st, 1978)
• who stayed in school throughout 1979-1993,
• who were observed for less than 8 years after their entry date
• without employment data during the 1979-1993 period.
The start of the ﬁrst non-enrollment (in education) spell lasting more than 12 months de-
termines the sample selection entry date. From 1981 onwards, the NLSY provides a dummy
variable for each month since the last interview which equals one if the respondent was enrolled
in that month and zero otherwise. The ﬁrst 12 month non-enrolled streak identiﬁes entry into
employment and the ﬁrst month of that streak as the entry month. The 1979-1980 survey years
require a diﬀerent method for determining entry as the NLSY only provides information on
the date last enrolled. For these two survey years, the number of months between the date
last enrolled and the interview date identiﬁes the entry date for those who had 12 months in
between.
An important characteristic of the NLSY is job identiﬁers that reveal transitions to previous
jobs. A “main job” dummy variable for a particular month is constructed to compute job
transitions. In particular, instead of using all of the overlapping jobs the worker could have held
in the same month, the following tie-breaking rules were adopted for months where more than
one job was held:
1. The job that had the most hours worked per week is taken to be the main job.
2. If there were two or more jobs with the same maximum hours, the job that began earlier
(earlier “jobstart”) is chosen as the main job.
3. If two or more jobs that month had the same maximum hours and “jobstart”, then the
one with higher wages is chosen as the main job.
4. If two or more jobs had the same hours, start and wages, then the one which lasted longer
(later “jobstop”) is considered the main job.
5. If there were still two jobs that had the same hours, start, stop and wages, these are
assumed to be exactly the same jobs, in which case the one with a smaller job id is
selected arbitrarily.
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As mentioned in the text, job-to-job transitions are computed by identifying the months for
which the main job changed such that the time gap between these jobs is less than a month and
the worker stops working for the ﬁrm where the main job was located. Non-employment spells
are identiﬁed when the main job variable is either missing or zero.
Further, job-to-job transitions are labeled as a quit (voluntary transition) when workers
declare that they left the previous employer because they either: (i) quit to take another job;
(ii) quit to look for another job; (iii) quit because of employment conditions (didn’t like work,
hours, working conditions, or location, didn’t get along with other employees or boss); (iv) quit
because interfered with school; (v) quit because of ill health, disability, or medical problems;
(vi) quit for pregnancy or family reasons; (vii) quit to enter armed forces or (viii) quit for other
reasons.
To complement the analysis presented in Section 2, the table below shows the distribution of
employment spells by demographic characteristics and the number of jobs they contain. There
are 26,094 employment spells in the sample, where 40% contain at least two job spells (at
least one job-to-job transition). Males, young workers and the more educated have a higher
proportion of employment spells with at least two job spells. Since employer returns can only
occur in employment spells with at least three jobs spells, the analysis in Section 2 focuses on
these types of spell, which account 23% of all employment spells. From those employment spells
with at least 3 jobs the distribution of job spells is as follows: 37% have exactly 3 jobs, 22%
have 4 jobs, 14% have 5 jobs, 8% have 6 jobs and the reminder 19% have 7 or more job spells.
Table 8: Distribution of Employment Spells
Jobs in employment spell
N 1 job 2 jobs 3+ jobs
All employment spells 26,094 0.5875 0.1831 0.2294
Gender
Female 13,391 0.6084 0.1841 0.2075
Male 12,703 0.5655 0.1821 0.2524
Age
25 or younger 18,464 0.5816 0.1769 0.2416
26-35 4,939 0.556 0.2011 0.243
36 and above 2,691 0.6864 0.1929 0.1208
Years of schooling
Below 12 6,213 0.6488 0.1648 0.1864
12 7,880 0.5831 0.1929 0.224
13-14 5,376 0.5746 0.1825 0.2429
16 2,040 0.526 0.2039 0.2701
17 and above 954 0.587 0.2002 0.2128
Notes The table reports the distribution of employment spells in the
NLSY sample by demographic characteristics and the number of jobs
during the spell.
The next table presents the full set of estimated coeﬃcients from the multinomial logit in
Section 7, columns 2 and 4 from Table 6. The regression of equation (8) uses three categories for
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Table 9: Multinomial Logit Coeﬃcient Estimates
EE EU
Coeﬃcients Std. Error Coeﬃcients Std. Error
Number of jobs in spell
2 1.849 0.028 -0.302 0.020
3 1.978 0.028 -0.458 0.026
4 2.083 0.031 -0.507 0.034
5 2.139 0.034 -0.489 0.041
6+ 2.277 0.030 -0.557 0.033
Job tenure (categorical)
2 -0.600 0.024 0.037 0.023
3 -0.822 0.028 -0.252 0.028
4 -0.889 0.032 -0.353 0.033
5 -1.055 0.034 -0.447 0.035
6 -1.154 0.039 -0.606 0.042
7 -1.190 0.042 -0.653 0.046
8 -1.215 0.046 -0.677 0.051
9 -1.322 0.037 -0.745 0.041
10 -1.416 0.043 -0.837 0.049
11 -1.575 0.047 -1.026 0.056
12 -1.641 0.055 -0.980 0.061
13 -1.742 0.038 -1.146 0.043
14 -1.868 0.061 -1.272 0.071
15 -2.031 0.072 -1.286 0.079
16 -2.082 0.083 -1.249 0.085
17 -2.044 0.089 -1.378 0.099
18 -2.062 0.079 -1.293 0.079
19 -2.111 0.081 -1.391 0.080
20 -2.408 0.084 -1.384 0.063
Experience -0.056 0.005 -0.088 0.008
Experience2 0.001 0.0001 0.002 0.0003
Years of Schooling
12 -0.096 0.021 -0.184 0.025
13-14 -0.121 0.024 -0.154 0.029
16 -0.215 0.029 -0.525 0.035
17 and above -0.164 0.037 -0.526 0.043
Part-time contract -0.627 0.021 -0.059 0.020
Male -0.004 0.014 -0.066 0.018
Married -0.210 0.017 -0.111 0.021
Divorced 0.033 0.027 0.118 0.033
Work in Government -0.093 0.033 -0.024 0.033
Union -0.114 0.025 -0.188 0.028
Lives in a city -0.028 0.014 -0.118 0.018
Lives in the South 0.010 0.014 0.000 0.018
Industry (categorical)
Mining -0.176 0.105 0.088 0.101
Construction -0.080 0.054 0.156 0.063
Manufacturing -0.346 0.052 -0.118 0.059
Transportation -0.286 0.060 -0.121 0.069
Wholesale -0.076 0.051 -0.086 0.057
Retail Trade -0.393 0.057 -0.274 0.065
Services -0.165 0.050 -0.048 0.057
Public Admin. -0.320 0.069 -0.079 0.077
Constant -3.180 0.130 -0.572 0.168
N 954,467
Notes The table reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the controls in the multinomial logit
presented in columns 2 and 4 in Table 6. The dependent variable has three categories.
Category 0 (baseline) represents no transition, category 1 represents a job-to-job transition
and category 2 represents a job-to-unemployment transition.
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the dependent variable. Category 0 (baseline) represents no transition occurring during month t,
category 1 represents a job-to-job transition occurring during month t and category 2 represents
a job-to-unemployment transition occurring during month t.
In addition to the positive (negative) relationship between the probability of an EE (EU)
transition and the cumulative number of jobs held during the employment spell, (as expected)
a negative relationship obtains between EE or a EU transitions and job tenure, labour market
experience and years of schooling, where the reference category for the latter is < 12 years of
schooling. Further, there is variation across industrial sectors in the probability of an EE or a
EU transition relative to the agriculture sector (the reference category).
The last set of tables present the full set of marginal eﬀects from the linear probability
model in Section 7, columns 3 and 4 from Table 7. These marginal eﬀects present a very similar
picture about the probability of an EU transition as the one obtained from the multinomial
logit coeﬃcients.
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Table 10: Linear Probability Model - Marginal Eﬀects
EU (3) EU (4)
Coeﬃcients Std. Error Coeﬃcients Std. Error
Number of returns in spell
1 0.00019 0.00051
2 0.00209 0.00120
3+ -0.00067 0.00127
Number of involuntary transitions in spell
1 0.00166 0.00040
2 0.00250 0.00070
3 0.00089 0.00096
4 0.00177 0.00130
Number of jobs in spell
2 -0.00865 0.00045 -0.00888 0.00045
3 -0.01074 0.00047 -0.01125 0.00047
4 -0.01106 0.00050 -0.01168 0.00050
5 -0.01112 0.00056 -0.01184 0.00057
6+ -0.01171 0.00049 -0.01266 0.00050
Job tenure (categorical)
2 0.00068 0.00088 0.00069 0.00088
3 -0.00915 0.00087 -0.00913 0.00087
4 -0.01178 0.00092 -0.01174 0.00092
5 -0.01373 0.00088 -0.01369 0.00088
6 -0.01660 0.00090 -0.01656 0.00090
7 -0.01717 0.00092 -0.01713 0.00092
8 -0.01746 0.00096 -0.01742 0.00096
9 -0.01816 0.00080 -0.01811 0.00080
10 -0.01887 0.00083 -0.01882 0.00083
11 -0.01993 0.00082 -0.01987 0.00082
12 -0.01926 0.00085 -0.01919 0.00085
13 -0.02036 0.00071 -0.02029 0.00071
14 -0.02099 0.00078 -0.02090 0.00078
15 -0.02090 0.00081 -0.02081 0.00080
16 -0.02059 0.00083 -0.02049 0.00083
17 -0.02127 0.00086 -0.02118 0.00086
18 -0.02079 0.00082 -0.02070 0.00081
19 -0.02144 0.00080 -0.02136 0.00080
20 -0.02152 0.00082 -0.02142 0.00082
Notes The table reports the ﬁrst set of marginal eﬀects from the linear probability model in Table 7, columns 3
and 4.
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Table 11: Linear Probability Model - Marginal Eﬀects - continued
EU (3) EU (4)
Coeﬃcients Std. Error Coeﬃcients Std. Error
Experience (categorical)
(3, 9] -0.01131 0.00062 -0.01129 0.00062
(9, 17] -0.01158 0.00077 -0.01153 0.00077
> 17 -0.01096 0.00091 -0.01092 0.00091
Years of Schooling
12 -0.01171 0.00086 -0.01171 0.00086
13-14 -0.01218 0.00089 -0.01215 0.00089
16 -0.01656 0.00088 -0.01652 0.00088
17 and above -0.01575 0.00092 -0.01575 0.00092
Part-time contract 0.00251 0.00052 0.00249 0.00052
Male -0.00122 0.00034 -0.00134 0.00034
Married -0.00204 0.00037 -0.00201 0.00037
Divorced 0.00112 0.00058 0.00113 0.00058
Work in Government 0.00015 0.00063 0.00011 0.00063
Union -0.00369 0.00049 -0.00367 0.00049
Lives in a city -0.00232 0.00033 -0.00231 0.00033
Lives in the South -0.00015 0.00034 -0.00011 0.00034
Industry (categorical)
Mining 0.00062 0.00219 0.00055 0.00219
Construction 0.00140 0.00154 0.00136 0.00154
Manufacturing -0.00252 0.00141 -0.00250 0.00141
Transportation -0.00234 0.00149 -0.00224 0.00149
Wholesale -0.00188 0.00143 -0.00182 0.00142
Retail Trade -0.00408 0.00146 -0.00401 0.00145
Services -0.00091 0.00141 -0.00086 0.00141
Public Admin. -0.00082 0.00162 -0.00075 0.00162
Constant 0.06536 0.00173 0.06526 0.00172
N 954,467
Notes The table reports the second set of marginal eﬀects from the linear probability model in Table 7, columns
3 and 4.
34
